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vestment in the property is afforded. While this struggle is no longer
at crest, it continues in various forms before commissions and courts.
The author is of the Brandeis-Holmes school, a stout defender
of "prudent investment." The lack of any detailed consideration of
what constitutes a "fair return" is a matter of regret. So, too, is the
want of consideration of the "cost of money" in determining a fair
rate of return. The author's views would be of interest and of value.
It is to be hoped that at some later day he will add to the debt owing
him by administrators and practitioners by setting forth his views on
these subjects.
FRANK H. SOMMER.*
CONTRACTS To MAKE WILLS. By Bertel M. Sparks. New York:
New York University Press, 1956. Pp. 230. $5.00.
This is a treatise on the legal relations arising-out of contracts
to devise or bequeath. The author has adequately stated these rela-
tions. In addition, he has underlined some of the confusion in this
area originating in a failure to differentiate the legal incidents of a
contract and those of a will. It is elementary that a contract, once
made, creates mutual rights and obligations and cannot be revoked by
the unilateral action of either party thereto. On the other hand, it is
likewise elementary that a duly executed will does not create a legal
interest in any of the beneficiaries named therein, and it may -be re-
voked by the testator at any time. A testator is generally acknowl-
edged to possess this power to revoke his will, even though such will
-was drawn in accordance with a contract theretofore made by him.
It has been stated in some leading judicial opinions that a con-
tract to devise or bequeath may be revoked upon notice given by one
party to the other, but that such a contract cannot be revoked after
the death of either party thereto, apparently on the theory of estoppel.
.Ifthe-courts making these observations had the contract to devise or
bequeath exclusively in mind, they are obviously inaccurate. A con-
tract to devise or bequeath, like any other contract, cannot be revoked
upon notice given by one party to the other; like other contracts, it
can be terminated only upon the consent of both parties thereto.
Furthermore, a contract of this kind is enforceable to, some extent
during the lifetime of both parties thereto, and upon the death of
•Deputy Attorney General, assigned to New Jersey Department of Public
Utilities, Board of Public Utility Commissioners; Dean Emeritus of New York
University School of Law.
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either party, it is in all respects enforceable, without invoking the
doctrine of estoppel.
If, on the other hand, the courts making these statements had a
will exclusively in mind, they are again inaccurate. A will drawn
pursuant to a contract may be revoked at any time by either party
during the lifetime of both or by the survivor, and it is not necessary
to give notice to anyone. Compliance with the local revocatory statute
is all that is required.
The author traces this confusion to what is probably its source
and makes appropriate recommendations with respect thereto.
It should be observed that a will drawn pursuant to a contract is
not by that fact deprived of one of its chief attributes, namely, its
revocability. The great weight of authority holds that if a will is
drawn pursuant to a contract, the testator is not legally incapacitated
from revoking that will and drawing another in violation of the con-
tract. This is reinforced by statutes in some jurisdictions which
provide for the admission to probate of the last will and testament
of a decedent and no other.
A contract to devise or bequeath of course imposes some restric-
tions upon the promisor's use of that part of his property which is
affected by the contract. These restrictions we should naturally ex-
pect to find clearly and specifically enumerated in the contract.
Apparently, however, some of these contracts are drawn by laymen,
or possibly by attorneys who may have been unaware of the necessity
of making any provision with respect thereto. As a result, these con-
tracts usually do not specify any restrictions upon the promisor's use
of that part of his property affected by the contract. The courts then
are confronted with the necessity of making a determination with re-
spet to a matter which was probably not in the contemplation of the
parties, or, if it was in their contemplation, they neglected to include
in the contact any provisions with respect thereto. This, in most
cases, is tantamount to determining what under the circumstances is
equitable and just. The author suggests that the draftsmen of these
contracts be more fully aware of the many difficulties involved, and of
their commensurate obligations and responsibilities.
In some of the opinions concerned with the rights of the promisee
against the promisor or his estate, the nature of the relationship be-
tween them has been considered. Presumably as an aid in ascertain-
ing their mutual rights and obligations, the relationship between them
has been likened to an express or constructive trust in which the
promisor is the trustee, and the promisee is the beneficiary; and also
to a life estate and remainder, the promisor being the life tenant, and
the promisee the remainderman. The author properly suggests that
the legal problems arising under a contract to devise or bequeath
cannot be solved by likening it to more commonly used plans for the
disposition of property. He correctly points out that it is merely a
contract purporting to direct a certain disposition of part or all of
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the testator's property, and likening it to other relationships subserves
no useful purpose.
The marriage of the promisor in a contract to devise or bequeath
may create a conflict of interest between the promisee and the spouse
of the promisor in the disposition of which a variety of solutions has
been purposed. If the contract precedes the marriage, as. a matter of
law, the rights of the promisee under the contract should be accorded
priority even though the subject matter of the contract is the
promisor's entire estate. However, in view of the fact that this
would invariably work an injustice, there has been considerable modi-
fication. The author has thoroughly reviewed the various facets of
this problem.
In New York, and some other jurisdictions, a contract either to
devise or bequeath must comply with the Statute of Frauds. 1 Hence
the contract or some note or memorandum thereof must be in writing
and subscribed by the party to be charged. Attention is called to
the fact that the contract or memorandum may be included in the
will itself, provided it contains a recital of all the essential terms.
Frequently in recent years that is precisely where the courts have
found either the memorandum or contract.
These contracts, the author suggests, may be used as estate plan-
ning devices. Certainly there are some desirable objectives which
can be achieved by no other effective or available device. It is evident,
however, that there are but few of these. This observation is empha-
sized by the fact that in the chapter purporting to cover this matter
exclusively,2 there are but five pages devoted to it, the balance of the
chapter being a summary of some of the material appearing in other
chapters of the book.
These and many other equally significant subjects are handled in
this excellent Volume with scholarliness, and in a style that is both
lucid and attractive. The work is a valuable contribution to the
literature in this field.
GEORGE F. KEENAN.*
IN.Y. Pmis. PRO. LAW §31(7).
2 Pp. 187-200.
* Executive Assistant to the Mayor of The City of New York; Professor
of Law, St. Johns University School of Law.
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